This is the third in our series of reports looking at retail trends in major economies.
This is the third report in our series looking at retail trends in major countries. Our first report discussed Germany and our second report covered France.
Turkey presents something of a contradiction to international retailers looking for growth markets to tap. Macro factors at work in the country, such as economic expansion, a growing and young population, strong retail sales growth, and a fragmented retail sector, bode well, in theory, for sophisticated retailers. They could benefit from growth and consolidation opportunities in the country.
Yet distinct shopping preferences and a less-than-transparent regulatory regime have worked against some international retail entrants. Moreover, recent domestic troubles, including terrorism and the attempted coup in July 2016 have created a backdrop of uncertainty that is likely to persist. This dichotomy is at the heart of our coverage.
The first section of this report focuses on the retail sector and discusses the following themes:
We then place retail in context, with a consideration of key macro indicators, such as economic growth rates and forecast population changes, before turning our attention to recent political instability, with a focus on the impacts of the recent coup attempt.
RETAIL IN FOCUS: A MARKET THAT IS TOUGHER THAN IT LOOKS
In this section, we consider the characteristics of Turkish retail sector. In particular, we emphasize that international retailers have found Turkey a difficult market in which to succeed, despite positive data points on metrics ranging from economic expansion to retail sales.
In recent years, the Turkish retail sector has enjoyed buoyant growth. The retail sales volume index for Turkey—which measures inflation-adjusted changes in sector sales—grew by 28.5% from 2010 through 2015. By comparison, the retail sales volume index for Germany increased by only 5.5% during the same period. The total size of the retail sector in Turkey reached an estimated US$303 billion in 2013 (latest), according to Deloitte.
However, the year-over-year increase in retail sales slowed in the period from 2012 through 2015. This reflects a slowing of economic growth and a deterioration in consumer confidence, which we discuss in more detail later. Even with this weakening, annual growth has remained at rates that would be the envy of retailers in Western Europe.
Grocery Dominates Retail
We begin our discussion of retail trends with a look at Turkey’s very substantial grocery sector.
According to the US Department of Agriculture, the grocery sector accounted for 60% of all retail sales in 2015. To place this in context, in the UK food retailers accounted for 45% of all retail sales last year. Deloitte estimates that the total value of grocery retailing in Turkey will reach US$150 billion by 2018.
Consumer expenditure on food and nonalcoholic beverages grew at an 11% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) from 2009 through 2014, reaching TRY12 billion (US$5.5 billion) in 2014, according to TurkStat. Turkish consumers kept spending on groceries despite slowing economic growth.
The graph below shows that, in constant prices, grocery sales growth clearly trended upward in the five years through 2015, in contrast with overall retail trade growth, which trended downward in the same period (as shown in the graph above).
Grocery in Turkey: A Challenging Market for Outsiders
Despite being an attractive and growing retail market, Turkey is characterized by three main factors that make it challenging for international retailers to operate in the country: Turkish consumers tend to prefer proximity shopping, the country’s small independent operators are strong and the country’s modern retail sector is fragmented, with strong local players. These factors have also slowed the proliferation of supermarkets and hypermarkets seen in other geographies.
1. Proximity Shopping Is Popular
Despite Turkey’s proximity to the world’s largest oil producers, Turkish consumers pay very high gasoline prices, which discourage unnecessary car rides to out-of-town grocery-shopping destinations. According to the World Bank, in 2014, the pump price for gasoline in Turkey was US$2.06 per liter (US$7.79 per gallon), the sixth-highest price in the world.
Traffic congestion also prevents consumers from moving around easily in Turkish cities. According to the TomTom Traffic Index, which measures the congestion on road networks in 295 cities around the world, Istanbul has the third-highest traffic congestion level in the world.
2. Strong Small Independents
Small independent retailers still retain a large share of the Turkish retail market. According to Global Source Partners, in 2015, such companies accounted for about 40% of the retail sector in Turkey, versus an average of 20% in Europe.
Small independent retailers are particularly strong in the grocery sector, where traditional neighborhood grocery shops, known as “bakkals,” are renowned for their displays of fresh fruits and vegetables, their ties to the neighborhood and their willingness to extend credit.
3. Strong Domestic Players in a Fragmented Retail Sector
Turkey’s modern (or organized) retail segment is led by domestic players, which create a highly competitive market where international firms’ penetration is very low. We define “modern retail” as the segment of the industry composed of players that operate chain stores that are all owned or franchised by a central entity. The segment is highly fragmented in Turkey and accounts for 60% of the total retail sector, according to Global Source Partners.
The top six grocery retailers in Turkey held just 14.8% of the grocery retail market in 2013, according to the Irish Food Board. Of these, the top three are domestic retailers, and, as of 2016, only one, Carrefoursa, is partly owned by a foreign group.
Discounters Lead Grocery Retail
Of the top six grocery retailers in Turkey, three—BIM, A101 and Sok—are discounters. The discounters’ share of modern grocery retailing in Turkey exceeds their peers’ share in Germany, which we refer to as “Discountland” in our May 2016 report German Retail Overview—this report can be found at bit.ly/FungGermanRetail
According to Kantar Retail, discounters accounted for 41% of modern grocery retail in Turkey in 2013 and for 33.8% of total retail. In Germany, discounters accounted for 40.1% of modern grocery retail in 2015, according to Euromonitor data. This compares with single-digit shares for discounters in other mature markets, including France, the UK and the US.
Discount is also the fastest-growing grocery sales channel in Turkey. According to Kantar, discounters will account for 44.0% of grocery retail by 2018, growing at a CAGR of 19.6% from 2013 through 2018. The channel is growing at the expense of supermarkets, hypermarkets and traditional grocery retailers.
Discounters have been able to rapidly expand because they meet three primary needs of Turkish consumers: they provide proximity shopping, one-stop shopping and low prices.
How Other Grocery Retailers Have Responded to Discounters
Confronted with the growth of discounters such as BIM, other modern grocery retailers have reacted by offering larger product ranges, more fresh food, more brands and private labels, competitive pricing, and more ways to shop through different store formats.
Even as nondiscounters have moved to counter the discounters’ growth, Turkish discounters have diversified from their core business model to include more fresh food, bakery and enhanced customer service, adding further competitive pressure to other retailers. For instance, in 2015, BIM launched FILE, a new banner that offers larger stores, a wider product range that includes patisserie, meat-charcuterie, fresh food and personal care, and that focuses more attention on customer service and outlet aesthetic. With FILE, BIM aims to gain further share of the grocery market at the expense of nondiscount retailers.
Domestic Firms Also Lead Nongrocery Retail
While grocery is the main retail sector in Turkey, other segments are worth considering in terms of their size and dynamism, particularly the apparel and footwear and consumer electronics segments.
Similar to the grocery segment, the apparel and footwear segment in Turkey is characterized by fragmentation and the presence of strong domestic players. However, international fast-fashion retailers have expanded dynamically in the country.
Turkish consumers show a strong propensity to spend on apparel and footwear and it is one of the fastest-growing retail categories in retail in Turkey. Consumer expenditure in the category grew at a CAGR of 15% from 2009 through 2014, reaching TRY3.1 billion (US$1.4 billion) in 2014, according to TurkStat. The statistics agency estimates that clothing and footwear specialists’ sales grew at a CAGR of 17% (in current prices) from 2010 through 2015, making clothing and footwear specialty retail the fastest-growing channel after e-commerce. Deloitte estimates that the Turkish clothing and footwear sector will reach a total value of US$37 billion by 2018.
However, despite the category’s overall growth in recent years, year-over-year sales growth slowed between 2012 and the end of 2015, in response to slower economic growth and a deterioration in consumer confidence.
Domestic apparel and footwear retailer Waikiki leads the sector. The retailer operates in Turkey and in a number of other markets, including Russia and other economies in Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. In 2013 (latest), Waikiki generated US$2.5 billion in global revenue, while its share of the Turkish market was 16.5%, according to company reports.
Waikiki’s leading position is due to its strong presence, competitive pricing and diverse range of clothing. It is one of the best-established retailers in the market and enjoys strong brand awareness among consumers. The company has more than 400 stores in Turkey and targets budget-conscious shoppers. The brand caters to the wardrobe needs of a broad range of people, from fashionable young people to more conservative middle-aged customers. Waikiki was initially a French brand; it started to source garments from Turkey and was then purchased by Turkish entrepreneurs in 1997.
Unlike in other retail segments, where international companies have been gradually disengaging from Turkey, in apparel, international fast-fashion chains have been expanding. Turkey has a relatively young population with westernized tastes in fashion, especially in Istanbul and other large cities. This creates a favorable environment for international fast-fashion retailers.
From 2010 through 2015, Spanish apparel retailer Inditex expanded its store network in Turkey by 77 units. By January 2016, it was operating 191 stores in the country. Inditex has a brick-and-mortar presence in the market for all but two of its concepts. The retailer is planning to extend online operations in Turkey for all its brands during 2016. Turkey is also a very important sourcing hub for Inditex, which sources from countries with geographical proximity to its main European markets to ensure speed to market.
Swedish fast-fashion retailer H&M entered the Turkish market in 2010. For fiscal year 2015, the company reported Turkish sales of SEK2.2 billion (US$260.9 million), a year-over-year increase of 65.5% in reporting currency, and expanded its store network in Turkey by 16 units. By November 30, 2016, H&M had a total of 46 stores in Turkey.
Inditex and H&M’s numbers reveal that these international fast-fashion retailers are expanding significantly in the Turkish market, despite the strength of domestic companies and an economic slowdown.
We believe that the positioning of these international retailers benefits them, as they do not compete directly with strong domestic players. Waikiki, for example, caters to a broader consumer base that includes more conservative, older consumers living in second-tiers cities, while Inditex and H&M target primarily younger, aspirational and fashion-conscious urban consumers who seek internationally recognized brands.
Turkey has a relatively young population and has seen rapid urbanization, making it an appealing market for consumer electronics retailers. Sales of products such as smartphones have been growing rapidly. According to market research agency eMarketer, the number of smartphone users in Turkey grew by 38% year over year in 2014, to 22.1 million (about 30% of the population), and the firm expects the number to reach 48 million by 2019.
Sales by IT and telecoms specialist stores grew at a CAGR of 10% in current prices from 2010 through 2015, according to TurkStat. The total value sales of consumer electronics and technological goods in Turkey exceeded US$16 billion in 2013, according to Deloitte. However, similar to apparel, year-over-year growth in consumer electronics sales slowed in the period from 2011 through 2015.
As with other main retail sectors, consumer electronics retail in Turkey is characterized by fragmentation and by the lead of domestic players, including Teknosa, Bimeks, Vestel, Vatan Computer, and Koç Holding’s retail banners, Arcelik and Beko.
Teknosa, with an 8% share of the market, is the leading player in consumer electronics and white goods retailing in Turkey, according to company reports. The company generated TRY3.2 billion (US$1.2 billion) turnover in 2015, an increase of 5% year over year. Teknosa maintains its leading position thanks to its:
German retailer Metro Group, through its Media Saturn operation, is the most notable international company with a presence in the Turkish consumer electronics sector. The company entered the market in 2007, when it opened a Media Markt store in Istanbul. As of September 2015, Media Saturn had 41 stores in Turkey, mainly concentrated in the largest cities. In its 2015 annual report, Metro commented that its consumer electronics retail business in Turkey had proven extraordinarily robust, achieving solid double-digit growth.
Domestic players leverage their strong presence and brand recognition to gain competitive advantages over foreign retailers. As in other markets, a strong brick-and-mortar presence is particularly important in consumer electronics retailing in Turkey, as store personnel can provide pre- and after-sales customer service that is highly valued by consumers, especially those unfamiliar with technology devices. In this sense, companies such as Teknosa, which has 278 stores versus Media Saturn’s 41, have a clear competitive advantage.
Locals Consolidate While Internationals Disengage
Turkey was particularly attractive to international retailers during the country’s period of economic growth that began in 2002. However, foreign retailers soon found that, despite the apparently favorable environment, it was very difficult to succeed without the support of a domestic partner, in part due to strong domestic competition. A lack of transparency in regulations was another factor: the World Bank and the US Department of Agriculture are among the institutions to have noted the unpredictability and complexity of Turkish regulations.
As the Turkish economy began slowing 2012, a number of international retailers started to disengage from the market, ceding their stakes to their local partners or selling their operations to domestic competitors. In 2013, the number of international companies that disengaged from the Turkish market was particularly high.
More recently, in December 2014, Anadolu, a Turkish conglomerate, agreed to buy a stake in leading nondiscount grocery retailer Migros from UK-based private-equity firm BC Partners. Anadolu bought half of the 80.5% stake that BC Partners had acquired in 2008 from Turkish group Koç Holding, which had owned the retailer since 1975. Migros was originally the Turkish operation of Swiss grocery retailer Migros, which entered the market in 1954.
British retailer Tesco is the most recent international player to exit the Turkish market. On June 10, 2016, the company agreed to sell its Turkish operation, Kipa, to Migros for about US$43.5 million. Migros is planning to divest the retail banner’s larger store formats and expand its smaller store formats, as Kipa’s overreliance on the former was one of the reasons the chain was loss making.
International retailers’ disengagement is fueling Turkish players’ consolidation strategies, and domestic companies are using acquisitions to scale up their businesses.
E-Commerce Has Room to Expand Further
Turkey has shown mixed progress when it comes to digitalization.
Turkey is delayed in certain aspects of digitalization, which means its e-commerce market lags that of most other developed countries. E-commerce’s share of total retail was only 2% in Turkey in 2015, versus 7.1%, on average, in developed markets, according to the Turkish Informatics Industry Association (TUBISAD).
However, Turkey’s relatively high rates of mobile Internet and social-network use, combined with a young and growing urban population, make it an environment conducive to growth: e-commerce grew by 31% year over year in 2015, to TRY24.7 billion (US$9.1 billion), according to TUBISAD.
In terms of the competitive environment, Internet retailing in Turkey is characterized by the lead of local players, as are other retail channels. This mirrors the situation in China, where international firms such as Amazon are confronted with strong domestic players and, to some extent, a hostile business and regulatory environment. But unlike in China, e-commerce in Turkey is also characterized by high fragmentation, as are other retail segments in the country.
Domestic firm Hepsiburada, the leading e-commerce pure play, has a market share of 15%, according to the Abraaj Group, a private-equity firm that acquired a 25% stake in the company in February 2015. The Istanbul-based company was established in 1998 as an IT hardware online retailer, but soon started to diversify its portfolio. As of 2015, it had a product range of more than 500,000 items across 30 categories. Today, consumers can buy anything from food to clothing to smartphones to cosmetics on Hepsiburada.com. The company is majority owned by Turkish conglomerate Dogan Group, which bought it in 1999.
Hepsiburada has been referred to as the Amazon of Turkey. It is the leading e-commerce retailer in its domestic market, as Amazon is in its own. It shares other striking similarities with Amazon, too, including:
Among international e-commerce pure plays, US-based eBay is the only one with a significant presence in Turkey. The company trades in the country through the GittiGidiyor online marketplace, in which eBay acquired a majority stake in 2011. GittiGidiyor was launched in 2001 as a Turkish equivalent to eBay.
Leading brick-and-mortar retailers in Turkey dipped their toes into e-commerce and multi-channel retailing early, and they continue to implement strategies to take advantage of the growth in e-commerce. Migros and Teknosa provide two illustrative examples:
RETAIL IN CONTEXT: ATTEMPTED COUP CAUSES DISARRAY
In this section, we place the retail sector in context, with a discussion of macro indicators such as economic growth, and a consideration of recent turmoil within Turkey.
Economic Growth Outpaces that of Western European Nations
Underlying uncertainty has been eroding Turkey’s economic growth and consumer confidence in recent years. The country was hit by a severe financial crisis in 2001, caused by a rapid fleeing of international investors worried about political and economic instability. This left a vacuum in capital that Turkish banks—which were holding a massive amount of sovereign bonds that the government was not able to pay off—could not fill.
In response to the 2001 recession, Ankara adopted financial and fiscal reforms as part of an International Monetary Fund program, which strengthened the country’s economic fundamentals and led to an era of strong growth.
However, in 2012, economic growth slowed by 670 basis points due to internal sociopolitical tension and regional geopolitical turbulence. The eurozone crisis exacerbated the situation, as Turkey is largely dependent on Europe for its exports and for foreign direct investment. The recession in Russia, an important commercial partner for Ankara, combined with worsening bilateral relations between the two countries, also contributed to the volatility of the Turkish economy.
Nevertheless, the economy showed resilience and accelerated in 2013, even amid concerns about high inflation and the volatility of the Turkish lira against major currencies.
Prior to the recent coup attempt, the country’s annual GDP growth was projected to remain close to 4% in 2016 and 2017, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). To place this in some context, in 2015, Eurostat recorded real GDP growth of 2.2% in the UK and 1.7% in Germany.
Young and Growing Population with Propensity to Spend
Turkey’s demographics add to its appeal for retailers. The country has a large population, numbering 78.2 million in 2015, almost equal to Germany’s. But the Turkish population has also been growing relatively fast, at 1.2% per year, on average, from 2010 through 2015, according to TurkStat, and it is expected to continue to grow at an average of 1.0% through 2020. By comparison, the population of Germany declined marginally, by an average of 0.1% per year, in the five years through 2015, according to Eurostat data.
In addition, Turkey’s population is relatively young. The average age of the country’s population is 30.1, which is 16.4 years younger than the average person in Germany, according to the CIA’s World Factbook.
Turkey shows high rates of urbanization and increase in population density. Istanbul, a city of 14 million people, has a population that is growing at a rate of 3.45%, which makes it one of the fastest-growing megacities in the world, according to Forbes.
Consumer expenditure is another indicator that showed resilience to the economic uncertainty that began in 2012. Household consumption expenditure grew very rapidly—at a CAGR of 17.5%—in the period of sustained economic growth from 2002 through 2009. But even when the economy started to slow down in 2012, Turkish consumers kept spending: household consumption expenditure continued to grow substantially, at a CAGR of 15.1% from 2010 through 2014, according to data from TurkStat, despite a weakening of consumer confidence.
Background to the July 2016 Attempted Coup
In the recent past, Turkey has been buffeted and challenged by a series of domestic traumas. These include shootings and bombings by ISIS, such as at Istanbul airport on June 28 and at a wedding in southeastern Turkey on August 20; violence from Kurdish PKK terrorists; and an attempted coup by elements in the Turkish armed forces on July 15. The coup failed, but there was a great deal of bloodshed by the coup plotters, who almost succeeded in killing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
As the coup attempt was under way, hundreds of thousands of Turks took to the streets and confronted the military at the behest of the government. This popular support by civilians in large part caused the attempt to fall apart.
Since the coup attempt, thousands of soldiers, judges, academics, journalists, media staff and others have been detained, imprisoned and/or forced to resign their posts. Universities, newspapers, charitable foundations and other institutions have been closed, and their assets seized. More than 1,500 academic deans have been forced to resign, and academics are prohibited from traveling abroad. Erdogan declared a three-month state of emergency on July 20, and Turkey’s Parliament approved it on July 21, giving Erdogan authority to rule by decree. After the coup attempt, Turkey revoked its participation in the European Convention on Human Rights and announced its intention to reintroduce the death penalty. The changes will likely lead to diminished human rights in Turkey.
Some Turkish political leaders have accused the US of organizing the attempted coup. Such claims have been firmly denied by US Secretary of State John Kerry as well as by US Ambassador to Turkey John Bass.
Turkey has accused a preacher living in Pennsylvania, Fethullah Gulen, of masterminding the coup, and has sought his extradition from the US to Turkey. The US response from President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Kerry has been that the US is required to follow certain legal procedures under the extradition treaty between the US and Turkey. The legal process could take years to resolve.
Political Leadership
Erdogan’s party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), won the national Parliamentary elections in November 2015, achieving a majority in the Parliament. Both the president and prime minister of the country are members of the AKP; Erdogan was elected president in 2014 for a five-year term and Binali Yildirim is currently the prime minister. While the prime minister technically and legally holds power, Erdogan has turned the historically ceremonial post of president into a very powerful position. Even before the attempted coup, Erdogan had significant control over many political functions, such as the military and intelligence. In the wake of the coup attempt, Erdogan’s power and influence have increased; with the state of emergency, the revocation of the European Human Rights Convention and the removal of thousands of judges, as well as other actions, the president now wields much more power.
The AKP has been in power since 2002, except for a brief period between June and November 2015, when it lost its majority to the opposition parties. The principal opposition parties in the Turkish Parliament are the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the secularist party in the spirit of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Republic of Turkey; the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP); and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Kurdish party in Parliament.
It is of particular note that the AKP and Erdogan have accused the HDP of being a terrorist organization affiliated with the PKK Kurdish terrorist group, and have sought to remove HDP Parliament members’ immunity from prosecution, a right ordinarily held by all members of the Turkish Parliament. One of Erdogan’s goals has been to have the AKP achieve enough votes in Parliament so that he could legally assume the status of a “super-president,” with enhanced powers. This has eluded him to date because the AKP could not garner sufficient votes in Parliament. As a result of the attempted coup and state of emergency, however, Erdogan now has, in effect, achieved such a super-presidency.
Turkey’s Kurdish minority numbers more than 14 million and has complained of not being allowed to develop the Kurdish language and culture. The PKK Kurdish group has been at war with the Turkish military and civilians for many years, and has killed thousands, including innocent civilians. There was a brief hiatus in hostilities between 2013 and 2015, when the Turkish government and Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan engaged in a peace process, but the process fell apart in 2015 and attacks and counterattacks between the Turkish government and the PKK resumed.
About 73% of the Turkish population is Sunni Muslim and about 25% is Alevi (Alevism is an offshoot of Shiism). The population at large is divided between more-religious Turks, most of whom are aligned with Erdogan’s AKP, and other groups, including secular Turks and Kurds. Many religious Kurds support the AKP.
Implications of the July 2016 Attempted Coup
In light of the attempted coup, the future in Turkey cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. The actions of the three major credit-rating agencies underscore this:
Turkey’s current account deficit is the Achilles heel of its economy. The Turkish lira is down appreciably, and growth had slowed even before the coup attempt. This makes it unlikely that Turkey will be one of the top 10 countries in terms of GDP by 2023, the 100th anniversary of its founding—despite the government having announced that as a goal.
Also, prior to the coup attempt, tourism had fallen substantially due to recent attacks; the coup attempt struck a further blow to the industry.
The consideration of Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) has been in play for years, with Germany and France the leading opponents of it. The EU leadership has informed the Turks that the reimposition of the death penalty in the country and its revocation of the European Convention of Human Rights are not acceptable and will affect Turkey’s chances of joining the EU.
Furthermore, opinion polls from the Pew Research Center show extreme antipathy in Turkey for the US, the EU and the West in general. This sentiment is likely to increase, as the US has been blamed for the coup attempt. Erdogan has criticized the EU for holding prejudiced attitudes against Turks. We judge the chances for Turkey’s EU accession as zero, given the foregoing factors; so long as they remain consistent, we think Turkey will not be able to join the EU.
Gulen Extradition Request and Its Impact on US-Turkey Relations
The likelihood is very low that the US will extradite Gulen to Turkey to stand trial in the near future. As a US green card holder, Gulen is entitled to US constitutional rights, and the Turks need to provide solid proof of his involvement in the coup attempt before the US will extradite him. Already in Turkey, institutions seen as having ties to Gulen have been closed and their assets confiscated, and Gulen’s nephew and an aide have been arrested.
The Turkish government has suggested that the US’s failure to extradite Gulen will affect US-Turkish relations. We may even see a breakdown in relations that will imperil the existence of the US air base in Incirlik, which has been the launching point of the coalition war against ISIS in Syria. During the coup attempt, electrical power to Incirlik was cut off, and the Turks have claimed that tanks and other equipment from the base were used in the coup attempt. Some 50 nuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs) are kept at Incirlik.
Turkey may reach out to Russia and China as an alternative to maintaining close relations with the US. Russia is an important source for Turkey’s energy needs. As for China, Turkey had a dalliance with a Chinese company, CPMIEC, from which it considered acquiring missiles (these, incidentally, were not interoperable with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) equipment, causing great consternation in the US defense industry, which traditionally has provided missiles to Turkey). Ultimately, the Chinese deal did not go through.
Relations between the US and Turkey are likely to continue to be strained, and Turkey’s forming close relationships with Russia and China will only exacerbate the situation. Furthermore, Turkey’s future status in NATO is in doubt and Turkey may join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (of which China and Russia are key members) as an alternative.
Western Intervention in Turkey’s Internal Affairs Unlikely
The US government, as well as the current candidates for US president, have taken a hands-off approach regarding the recent events in Turkey. Obama and Kerry want to keep Turkey on board in the war against ISIS and also maintain full access to the coalition’s base of operations at Incirlik. As mentioned, Turkey is also a current member of NATO.
Donald Trump, the Republican Party nominee for president, commended Erdogan for turning the coup attempt around and believes in “America First,” a policy of staying out of the affairs of other countries. Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party nominee, is also unlikely to take any action against Turkey if she becomes president, as she recognizes Turkey’s importance in NATO and in the war against ISIS.
The Turkish government announced the reorganization of the military, which may leave Turkey open to more violence from the PKK and ISIS, which would further destabilize society.
Thousands of Turks have been fired, arrested and/or detained. The actions against academics will result in utter confusion when the academic year begins shortly. Some have even predicted that Turkey will suffer a “brain drain,” whereby academics will flee the country for other locales—although, at this point, academics are not permitted to travel abroad.
In addition, there is a literal schism in society between secular and religious Turks, which could lead to civil war. Unless this and the above-mentioned factors change, there will be continued instability in Turkey.
Impact on Retail
The Turkish economy and society are in disarray, but the government’s stated intention is to continue business as usual. It is unclear how this can occur, though, as Turkish citizens lack confidence in the future of the country and international investors worry about the risks of doing business and employing capital there.
At the time of writing, there are few economic, consumer or company data points available for August, the first full month after the coup attempt. Two metrics that have been published by TurkStat are the consumer confidence and economic confidence indices:
There is little doubt that the retail sector will have been impacted significantly in July and August. The downturn in tourism, the attacks on civilians and the attempted coup have resulted in empty streets and significantly diminished consumer activity in important locales such as the Taksim area in Istanbul. The retail sector in Turkey will certainly suffer unless the economy—and investor and consumer confidence—get back on track quickly and with strong effect.
In summary, these are the changes we will likely see in Turkish retail in the coming years:
Overhanging all of these industry-specific shifts is the heightened political, societal and economic uncertainty in the country. Turkey now has to deal with the fallout from the July 2016 attempted coup—and the full shape and effects of the post-coup response have yet to fully emerge. We therefore reiterate our view that the future in Turkey cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty.